September 9, 2003

Two years ago to this day, several representatives of American Muslim organizations arrived in Washington, DC to prepare for the first meeting with the President of the United States. The meeting was scheduled for 3 pm on September 11, 2001. By 9 am EST, it was clear that the meeting would be cancelled because America was struck by the worst terrorist attack in her history, and our lives after 9/11 would never be the same.

We are not here today to discuss civil liberties or to express grievances against our political opponents or even foreign countries who are violating the human rights of Muslims. We are here today to discuss America's national security initiatives, to review them, critique them as all responsible American citizens should, and finally to offer our recommendations that can enhance America's national security.

We want to put to rest the myth that American Muslims did not condemn 9/11. In fact, all of the condemnations against 9/11 by Muslims in America and those around the world are documented in Appendix A of MPAC's Counterterrorism Policy Paper. All of the statements by American officials speaking out against hostility towards Islam and Muslims are archived in Appendix B of the paper.

We, citizens and officials alike, are working together, determined to end the scourge of terrorism.

Terrorism and Extremism

The policy paper, entitled outlines three theoretical explanations of terrorism:
1) Terrorism's Root Causes--terrorism is unjust response to social, political and economic injustices;
2) Terrorism as a Strategic Choice-it is a strategy for small organizations that want to attract attention and impress audiences by terrifying them;
3) Terrorism as an ideology-terrorism becomes a way of thinking indoctrinating recruits subjected to cultures of incitement and taking on a psychology of hatred and prejudice.

Muslim extremism has three main components:
1) a sense of powerlessness that creates reactionary behavior and deepening mentality of victimization;
2) exploitation of legitimate grievances of Muslim masses, especially in Palestine, Iraq, Kashmir and Chechnya, as they point to double standards, where Jewish or Christian extremism and criminal behavior is not addressed, or even accepted, by international powers;
3) a distorted religious ideology that supports the clash of civilizations and promotes violence and hatred of anyone, even other Muslims, who disagree with extremist interpretation of religious texts.

The Moderate Voice

Muslim moderation is rooted in three important sources:
1) the Quran, which states in chapter 2, verse 143-We have willed you to be a community of moderation;
2) the reported words of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), admonishing the believers of Islam to avoid extremism either on the left or the right;
3) the hundreds of millions of voices of the Muslim masses who want cooperation not confrontation with the rest of the world, especially the United States.

The moderate Muslim voice calls for an end to terrorism, for rights of religious minorities (based on the Quranic injunction in chapter 2, verse 256-let there be no compulsion in matters of faith), for rights of Muslim women and for democratic reform.

Muslim moderation is sought out to replace the extremist voice as part of the strategy in the war on terrorism, but a troubling question is lingering in our American society: why are the moderate voices not heard? I have the same question. The moderate voice is transmitted every day by millions of Muslims, so why are they not received or amplified?

Terminology

MPAC's policy position papers addresses the issue of Wahhabism. I will quote directly from the document: "Wahhabism represents an exceptionally austere and puritanical interpretation of Islam, one that rigidifies the faith by insisting that a constricted, literalist approach to the texts and traditions of Islam is the only "valid" perspective on Islam. In addition, Wahhabi scholars often exhibit considerable religious intolerance, particularly toward the Shi'aa and other Muslims they regard as "heterodox." However, the mast majority of the world's Muslims, including American Muslims, are neither Wahhabis or educated in Wahhabi schools. While it is true that Saudi financial support has exaggerated the influence of Wahhabi beliefs in many American mosques, Islamic schools and other Muslim institutions, American Muslim opposition to Wahhabism stems more from its influence on the intellectual freedom of the larger Muslim community than on any conviction that adherents of Wahhabism have an "automatic" propensity toward violence...While the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) rejects many of the ideas espoused by the doctrine of Wahhabism, it opposes any persecution of its adherents. MPAC also rejects attempts by those who seek to conflate the terms "Wahhabi" and "terrorist" or to label individuals as "Wahhabis" with the intention of smearing and defaming them for political reasons, as doing so would be akin to holding Baptism or Orthodox Judaism accountable for the intolerant views or violent actions of a handful of their adherents."

Islamism is also a term that is misunderstood and misplaced. Utilized as a fancy term for Muslim extremism, Islamism is used to label all Muslims as potential threats. For the war on terrorism to succeed or to be effective, however, focus and concentration must be placed on the sources of terrorism, not on 1 billion people.

Counterterrorism Efforts

Let me quote from an engraved statement on a building at FBI headquarters here in Washington, DC. We noticed it on our way to meet with the FBI Director, Robert Mueller, in May of this year. The quote is attributed to J. Edgar Hoover and it reads: "The most effective weapon against crime is cooperation ...the efforts of all law enforcement agencies with the support and understanding of the American people." MPAC proposes community-based policing as the most effective means of fighting terrorism targeting America. Over the last two years, a healthy partnership developed between law enforcement and the American Muslim community. In an interview with FBI Director Mueller, which is also found as an appendix in the policy paper, he commends the American Muslim community for their contributions to counterterrorism in America.

Politics of Terrorism (as opposed to the policy on terrorism)

There remains a disturbing level of exclusion of American Muslims from the policy-making arena. To date, no American Muslim works on the policy-making level in the Department of Justice, the Pentagon, the State Department or the National Security Council on counterterrorism matters. It's not surprising that our government is deficient in cultural and linguistic interpreters for Muslim world affairs. It is also disconcerting that Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge has not responded to an invitation to meet with American Muslims, a request made in October 2001.

The Muslim moderate voice within the Bush Administration and on Capitol Hill has been distorted to mean passing a political litmus test in supporting the current foreign policy. The U.S. government has also mismanaged policy-making on several fronts. The Pentagon, for example, led in the rebuilding of Iraq, while the State Department was more equipped to lead in that task because of its collective knowledge of Muslim world dynamics and history. Now, Secretary Colin Powell is viewed as mopping up and then repairing relations with the international community after the US alienated members of the UN Security Council in its unilateral approach towards Iraq and claiming an al-Qaeda connection.

On the domestic front,while the FBI has done an exceptional job in outreaching to the American Muslim community, Attorney General John Ashcroft has promoted policies that have backfired in the war on terrorism. The INS registration process, for example alienated communities, including Persian Jewish and African and Hispanics, and accomplished nothing for the war on terrorism. The war on terrorism has at times been a surrogate for the war on immigration.

Recommendations

MPAC's policy paper provides many important recommendations for consideration to our decision-makers. The following is only a sample of these recommendations.

1) Terminology--The US government should accept and apply one definition of terrorism. MPAC offers the following: Terrorism is any violent or threat of violent action targeting non-combatants to achieve political or military goals.
2) Law Enforcement-the US government should fortify the community-based policing model by sponsoring more community forums and building advisory committees in major American cities comprising both community based organizations and law enforcement agencies (MPAC participates in the DC Advisory Committee and continues a healthy open working relationship with the FBI office in Los Angeles). Law enforcement should provide more specific guidelines in detecting and preventing terrorist activity in America.
3) Foreign policy-the US government should be consistent in its policies in terms of human rights and democracy, especially in relations with US allies; American values should be reflected in our foreign policy; with respect to the Palestinian Israeli conflict, even-handedness is not official US policy, yet our government claims to be an honest broker in the conflict; finally, anti-American sentiment has become a global phenomenon, not limited to the Middle East, and resentment of US policies is building among NATO allies, Eastern Europe, and the Asian Pacific.
4) Charities-the US Treasury should provide assistance to American charities that strive for compliance to the new Treasury guidelines issued in November 2002; several charities, including non-Muslim charities, have complained that the Treasury department's guidelines are vague and inadequate; American Muslim charities and others who work in the Muslim world are vital to promoting a positive image of America to the rest of the world; it is disconcerting that American corporations have been granted legal and financial immunity in Iraq, for example, yet non-profit organizations have been shut down for providing aid to the Iraqi people in violation of the sanctions regime, especially when Saddam Hussein benefited more from corporate activity in Iraq than from non-profit activity.